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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
PERSONAL INJURIES: SHOULD NON-TAXABILITY
OF JUDGEMENTS DECREASE AWARD?
In a recent case' the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided
that it was not error to have the jury compute an award for
loss of earning capacity by an injured railway switchman
based on his gross income, without regard to any income taxes
which he would have had to pay on such income had he not
been injured.2 By this decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
followed the great weight of authority refusing to allow in-
come tax consequences to be considered in fixing awards in
personal injury cases for future loss of earnings.3 The reasons
1 Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry. v. Miller, 486 P.2d 630 (Okla. 1971).
This award was for $99,000, to a man with a permanent
partial disability resulting from crushed feet. His life ex-
pectancy was 22.03 years, and his projected gross income
for each of those years was $7,801.64.
2 Such awards are not taxable under IT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 104 (a) (2), which provides that gross income does not in-
clude "the amount of any damages received (whether by
suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness." See also Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1 (c) (1960).
3 Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Culley
v. Pennsylvania Ry., 244 F. Supp. 710 (D. Del. 1965); Jen-
nings v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 516 (D. Md. 1959);
Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77
(1955); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan.
345, 350 P.2d 18 (1960); Oddo v. Cardi, 218 A.2d 373 (R.I.
1966); Hoge v. Anderson, 106 S.E.2d 121 (Va. 1958); Beh-
ringer v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 595,
95 N.W.2d 249 (1959). See also Feldman, Personal Injury
Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7 ARz.
L. REv. 272 (1966); Note, Damages-Refusal to Instruct Jury
to Calculate Loss of Earnings on the Basis of Net Income
After Taxes, 14 VAM=. L. REV. 639 (1961). Contra, McWeeney
v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); Moffa v. Perkins Truck-
ing Co., 200 F. Supp. 183 (D. Conn. 1961); Meehan v. Cen-
tral R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Grant v. Brook-
lyn, 41 Barb. 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864); British Transp.
Comm'n v. Gourley, [1956] A.C. 185 (1955).
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given by the courts for such refusal can be divided into four
general categories:
1. To allow deduction of income taxes from the plain-
tiff's recovery would deny the plaintiff the bene-
fit of a tax-free award, thereby thwarting congres-
sional intent;4
2. Determination of possible future income tax lia-
bility of the plaintiff is too conjectural;5
3. The matter of income tax liability is between the
plaintiff and the government, and such matter is
of no concern to the defendant, under the doctrine
of res inter alios acta;6
4. The average juror would be confused by the com-
plexity of computing the future tax liability of the
plaintiff.7
These reasons are analyzed below to determine whether or
not the majority rule is the best rule.
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Congress has always had the power to lay and collect
taxes,8 but could not tax incomes without apportionment
among the several states9 until the ratification of the 16th
4 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
6 Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944).
8 This idea first appeared in the English courts, in the cases
of Jordan v. Limmer & Trinidad Lake Asphalt Co., [1946]
K.B. 356, and Billingham v. Hughes, [1949] 1 K.B. 643.
These English cases were later overruled by British Transp.
Comm'n v. Gourley, [1956] A.C. 185 (1955), but not before
the idea was picked up by the American courts in the fol-
lowing cases: Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125
N.E.2d 77 (1955), and Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry. v. McFerrin,
291 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1956).
7 McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
8 Kerbaugh-Empire Co. v. Bowers, 300 F. 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1924),
affd, 271 U.S. 170 (1924).
0 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)
(declaring the Income Tax Act of 1894 unconstitutional).
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Amendment to the Constitution on February 25, 1913.10 In
early decisions involving awards for personal injuries the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue could not decide whether
such awards were income, and thus taxable, or "capital", and
not taxable." In 1918 Congress made amounts received by suit
or agreement on account of personal injuries non-taxable, ex-
cluding them from gross income.1 2 This bill was passed in or-
der to remove any doubt as to whether these amounts were
includable in gross income.' 3 It is quite possible that Congress
never intended to confer any special benefit upon this type
of plaintiff, merely desiring that, once the jury had properly
computed the award (with deductions for income tax), the
plaintiff would be protected against effective double taxation
should the Commissioner later determine that such awards
were taxable.' 4 The only evidence found by this author tend-
ing to show a legislative intent to confer an award free from
tax considerations to victims of personal injuries was in the
opinions of various courts.15
10 U.S. CONST. amend XVI, which states: "The 'Congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from what-
ever source derived, without apportionment among the sev-
eral States, and without regard to any census or enumera-
tion."
" The Commissioner at first thought that these awards were
taxable, likening them to insurance proceeds. However, a
short time later, after the Attorney General had advised
the Treasury Department that insurance proceeds were
"capital", 31 Op. ATT'y GEN. 304, 308 (1918), the Commis-
sioner reversed his position, and held that insurance pro-
ceeds and personal injury awards or settlements were not
taxable, 20 TREAS. DEc. INqT. REv. 457 (1918).
12 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213 (b) (6), 40 Stat. 1066. The
present statute is found at note 2.
13 H.R. RPP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1919).
14 Nordstrom, Income Taxes & Personal Injury Awards, 19
OiO ST. L.J. 212 (1958).
15 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77
(1955); Dixie Feed & Seed Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619,
376 S.W.2d 745 (Ct. App. 1963), appeal dismissed, 379 U.S.
15 (1964).
[Vol. 8, No. 2.
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FUTURE TAX LjABI-rY Too CONJECTURAL
It has been argued that the computation of one's income
tax depends upon such a myriad of facts that it would be ex-
tremely difficult to pinpoint with any accuracy the amount
of tax which the plaintiff might have incurred on earnings
he would have received had he not been injured.'6 Among the
factors which serve to greatly alter a taxpayer's liability for
income tax are the number of dependents claimed, which may
change with time,17 the amount of charitable contributions, the
marital status of the taxpayer,18 additional deductions at age
6510 and changes which Congress may make in tax legisla-
tion.20 While all of these things may serve to make a plain-
tiff's future tax liability less certain, the jury has been called
upon to determine many facts which are at least as uncertain,
for in determining the amount of an award for loss of future
earnings the jury may consider the plaintiff's life expectancy,21
the effect of injuries on his future earning capacity,22 the
present value of the award,2 inflation,24 and the capacity for
16 Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582, 591 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953), overruled as to form of jury instruction, Mis-
souri-Kan.-Tex. Ry. v. McFerrin, 291 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1956).
17 Id.
18 Id.
10 Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951), aff'd on rehearing, 186
F.2d 926 (1951).
20 Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953), overruled as to form of jury instruction, Missouri-
Kan.-Tex. Ry. v. McFerrin, 291 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1956).
21 Cole v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 443 (D.
Minn. 1945).
22 Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry. v. Edwards, 361 P.2d 459 (Okla.
1961).
23 Alabama G.S. Ry. v. Carroll, 84 F. 772 (5th Cir. 1898); Coff-
man v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 378 S.W2d 583 (Mo. 1964); Gal-
veston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Paschall, 92 S.W. 446 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1906).
24 27 states have allowed the decreased value of the dollar to
be considered by the jury in making an award for per-
19721
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employment for the rest of the plaintiff's life span.25 It is of
interest that the definite trend in wrongful death actions,
which are subject to many of the same considerations as per-
sonal injury actions as to the computation of loss of future
earnings, seems to be toward allowing a deduction from the
deceased's gross income of income taxes which would have
been paid had the deceased lived and earned this income.28
Assuredly, the incidence of future income taxes is
no more "guess work" and no more difficult of exact
calculation than possible future advancement, wage
increases and inflation, all matters to be taken into ac-
count in calculating future income. Nor is it to be for-
gotten that mathematical precision in fixing damages
is not demanded .... Unless such damages take in-
come taxes into consideration, the beneficiaries will
sonal injuries. E.g., Jakubec v. Southern Bus Lines, 31 So.
Zd 282 (La. Ct. App. 1947); Kelly v. Neff, 14 So. 2d 657 (La.
Ct. App. 1943).
25 Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 400 Pa. 315, 162
A.2d 222 (1960).26 Hartz v. United States, 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969); Cox v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1969); United States v. Sommers,
351 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1965); Brooks v. United States, 273
F. Supp. 619 (D. S.C. 1967); Anderson v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960); De Vito v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Floyd v.
Fruit Indus., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Sutton, 208 Okla. 388, 257 P.2d 307 (1953).
Contra, New York Cent. Ry. v. Delich, 252 F.2d 522 (6th
Cir. 1958); Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 Il. 2d 164, 133
N.E.2d 288 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956), rehear-
ing denied, 352 U.S. 937 (1957); Wawryszyn v. Illinois Cent.
Ry., 10 Ill. App. 2d 394, 135 N.E.2d 154 (App. Ct. 1956);
Bergfeld v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry., 103 Ohio App. 87, 3
Ohio Ops. 2d 167, 144 N.E.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1956); Smith v.
Pennsylvania Ry., 47 Ohio Ops. 49, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 282, 99
N.E.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1950). The tax status of wrongful
death awards is similar to personal injury awards. Rev.
Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 Cum. Bum. 179.
[Vol. 8, No. 2
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accordingly be receiving more than they would have
had the deceased lived.27
RES INTE Amos ACTA DOCTRINE
This doctrine first appeared in English cases dealing with
the computation of damages for lost future earnings,28 setting
down the rule that income tax liability is strictly between
the plaintiff and the government, and is of no concern to the
defendant. "If, by reason of having received these wages, he
is compelled to pay a certain amount for income tax, that is
a matter between him and the Crown."29 Although this doc-
trine has been picked up by several courts,30 it has drawn
sharp criticism from opponents of the collateral source rule,
to which it bears a close resemblance. 31 These critics argue
that the primary purpose of damages is to restore the plain-
tiff to his former position,32 not to punish the defendant.33
The defendant should not be forced into placing the plaintiff
in a better position than he would have been but for the in-
jury, which is the result when the defendant must compensate
the plaintiff for lost gross earnings when all the plaintiff
would have received was his net earnings after taxes had the
plaintiff not been injured. In the case of a plaintiff in a high
27 Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 629 (D. S.C.
1967) (a wrongful death action).
28 Jordan v. Limmer & Trinidad Lake Asphalt Co., [1946]
K.B. 356, and Billingham v. Hughes, [1949] 1 K.B. 643. These
cases were overruled by British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley,
[1956] A.C. 185 (1955).
29 Fine v. Toronto Transp. Comm'n, [1946] 1 D.L.R. 221, 223
(1945) (a Canadian case which followed Jordan, supra note
28).
30 Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 92 S.E.2d
874 (Ct. App. 1956); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d
135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry. v. Mc-
Ferrin, 291 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
31 Rowe, Damages in Personal Injury Action-Compensatory
or Jackpot?, 57 ILL. B.J. 540 (1969).
32 C. McCoRMvcK, McCoRMvcK ON DAMAGES 137 (1935).
8 77 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1964).
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6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 8 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss2/7
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
tax bracket, the disparity between net and gross earnings
can be enormous.3 4
This difference between net and gross income in the case
of the high bracket taxpayer has given rise to the McWeeney
Rule,3" which provides that income taxes are deducted from
the plaintiff's award for loss of future earnings only where
a substantial portion of his gross income would have gone for
taxes had he not been injured. Under this rule, an income of
$10,000 per year will not have income taxes deducted, 6 while
an income of $16,000 per year will be subject to a 15% de-
duction for income taxes.37 This rule was attacked in one law
review article, in which the author said, "[T]o allow the size
of the plaintiff's income to be the controlling factor would
discriminate between plaintiffs on a basis having no relation
to the amount of damages suffered and would not reduce the
conjecturality as to future tax liability."38 S u c h criticism
would appear justified, for it seems that the courts are legis-
lating their own sliding scale of taxes, determining at what
point and by what percentage these awards are taxable. Would
it not be better for them to apply the tax schedules already
enacted by Congress?
84 Le Roy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d
Cir. 1965). This was a wrongful death action in which it
was determined that the deceased would have earned about
$16,000 per year. The court allowed a 15% deduction for
income taxes, as the amount of tax in this case was too
large to be ignored.
35 McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
86 Montellier v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963) (a wrongful death
action).
, Le Roy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965).
38 Note, Damages-Refusal to Instruct Jury to Calculate Loss
of Earnings on the Basis of Net Income After Taxes, 14
VAmu. L. REv. 639 (1961).
[Vol. 8, No. 2
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EVIDENCE WOULD COMPLICATE TRIAL
There is no doubt that our income tax laws are compli-
cated, with taxable income often composed of income from
many sources other than earnings. This fact has made courts
wary of allowing any mention of income taxes to arise at trial.
Inquiries at a trial into the incidents of taxation in
damage suits of the character we have here, would
open up broad and new matters not pertinent to the
issues involved. Such subject matter would involve
intricate instructions on tax and non-tax liabilities
with all the regulations pertinent thereto. No court
could, with any certainty, properly instruct a jury
without a tax expert at its side.3 9
While it is true that income tax laws can be complicated,
the tax returns of the great majority of Americans are based
on income derived almost exclusively from earnings.40 The
average juror is quite familiar with the computation of in-
come tax on this type of income, and can undoubtedly make
a good estimate of the tax owed by determining the average
number of dependents, exemptions and deductions which the
usual plaintiff will have over his projected life span. It is
contended that a jury can determine the amount of tax which
the plaintiff would have paid on the income he would have
earned but for the injury at least as accurately as they can
determine the actual lifetime of the plaintiff, the permanency
of plaintiff's injuries, the possible earnings of the disabled
plaintiff, or the chances for advancement (and thus increased
earnings) which the plaintiff had before injury, all of which
are already considered by the jury in making an award for
loss of future earnings. 41 In those cases where the plaintiff
has income from many different sources the court will have
to spend much more time hearing evidence determining the
89 Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 509, 134 N.E.2d 555, 556
(1956).
40 F. LUNDBERG, THE RICH AND THE SUPER-RICH 8 et seq. (1968).
41 Nordstrom, supra note 14, at 215 et seq.
1972]
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amount of tax to be deducted, but the probabilities a r e
against such cases arising very often.42
There is another factor which has arisen in cases involv-
ing future loss of earnings which bears some mention. "In
the past few years the public press has carried many reports
of large sums won on television quiz programs or in lot-
teries. . . .These accounts almost always point out what a
very large percentage of the winnings must be paid to the
government as income tax."4 As a result, there exists a possi-
bility that a jury may believe that the award would be tax-
able in the same manner as lotteries, etc., and would add an
additional amount to the award for taxes which they errone-
ously believe would have to be paid. To counter this possi-
bility the courts have instructed juries that the awards are
not subject to state and federal taxes.44
This cautionary instruction has been criticized because
it introduces into the trial the matter of income tax, which
many courts feel is irrelevant.45 While this author feels that
it is relevant to introduce into a trial all of those factors nec-
essary to arrive at a plaintiff's actual damage, the instruc-
tion that an award is non-taxable opens up a Pandora's box
of possible erroneous applications of this information by a
jury. The jury, once informed that the award is not taxable,
might still make their computation on a net earnings basis
and would, thus, negate the intended effect of the instruction.
It would seem easier for the court, after it has decided that
income taxes should not be considered in the fixing of the
42 F. LUmBERG, supra note 40, at 8 et seq.
48 From the dissent of Chief Justice J. Edward Lumbard in
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 41 (2d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
4 Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1952).
45 McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); Hall v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Chicago, R.I.
& P. R.R. v. Kinsey, 372 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1962).
[Vol, 8, No. 2
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award for loss of future earnings, to exclude all mention of
taxes at the trial.
CONCLUSION
"How can the jury properly get the right results if it
has to work with the wrong facts?"46 In a society where one
is presumed to know the law, it seems ludicrous that we
should try to hide from the jury the existence of such a per-
vasive subject as taxation. Would not justice be better served
if the jury were allowed to consider all the factors entering
into these awards? The following model is presented as an
alternative to the present majority rule.
MODEL
The jury should be informed that the award for future
loss of earnings is not taxable, and that they should not, there-
fore, reimburse the plaintiff for taxes he will not have to
pay. The defendant, with the aid of discovery, should be able
to compel the production of the income tax returns of the
plaintiff for the past five years. The average amount of such
taxes shall be presumed to be the highest amount of taxes
which the plaintiff would have paid had he not been injured.
The plaintiff may offer into evidence any factors which might
make this tax less. Once computed, such tax should be de-
ducted from the plaintiff's gross earnings to yield net earn-
ings. Such net earnings should then be discounted to present
value, with inflation and the taxability of any interest re-
ceived from investment of the award being taken into con-
sideration.
This model removes much of the conjecturality inherent
in making awards for loss of earnings, as the plaintiff's tax
is based on an average of his tax years. Admittedly, this
model could not apply to minors or the unemployed, whose
earning capacity would have to be determined. The jury, in
determining such earning capacity, would have to make the
46 Rowe, supra note 31, at 541.
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appropriate deduction for income tax, which, as argued pre-
viously, they are quite capable of doing. This deduction of in-
come taxes from the plaintiff's award cannot be against con-
gressional intent, as none has been expressed. Absent evidence
of a contrary intent, it would seem wise to follow the general
rule of damages, and only restore to the plaintiff that which
he has lost. Finally, although the courts may have occasional
difficulty in instructing the j u r y on income tax law, "it
is hard to believe that the English language is not broad
enough and precise enough to make the jury understand the
impact on personal injury awards of section 104 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954."47
Mary T. Matthies
7 Nordstrom, supra note 14, at 212.
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